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Abstract 
The tsunami after the Great East Japan Earthquake on 11 March 2011produced a huge impact under which various oil tanks at ports and 
industrial complex and gas cylinders at homes, automobiles, etc. were damaged and caused hazardous materials such as gas and gasoline 
in those oil tanks, gas cylinders and fuel tanks to leak. In these situations, sparks from metals which collided each other by tsunami and 
through other scenarios may have ignited leaked combustible gases and gasoline to become fires. These fires spread to combustible 
materials in and from broken houses, automobiles etc. near around. Ignited broken houses, automobiles, fishing boats and other 
combustible materials floating with tsunami waves spread fires to accumulated combustible materials swept away by tsunami from 
broken houses and landed floating housesat stagnated points near banks and hillsides. There were also some cases that leaked gases from 
gas-cylinders and leaked gasoline from fuel tanks of automobiles under the accumulated materials have caused fires according to 
witnesses of residents. Leaked oil from tanks may have contributed to the combustion in these circumstances. In these ways, fires broke 
out at various places throughout the tsunami affected region and some escalated to large-scale urban fires especially in wooden urban 
areas. Many of the people that had been evacuated from the tsunami-affected zone to tsunami refuge buildings had once again to be 
evacuated to avoid the spreading, escalating fires. The fire spread area was wide, and it is commonly recognized among researchers of 
universities and research institutes that cooperation is necessary to share information of earthquake fires and tsunami fires. This paper is 
mainly based on an interim report of this kind of cooperation organized by the Japan Association for Fire Science and Engineering (2011). 
 2013 Published by Elsevier Ltd. Selection and/or peer-review under responsibility of the Asia-Oceania Association for Fire Science 
and Technology. 
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1. Status of fire breakouts 
According to the Fire and Disaster Management Agency (FDMA) , the number of the 2011 Great East Earthquake and 
Tsunami related fires is 286. Sekizawa et al. [2] conducted a questionnaire survey to fire departments in affected regions 
about six month after the fires. The result is shown in Table 1. There were 124 tsunami fires and the percentage of tsunami 
fires was high in Iwate and Miyagi prefectures where about 20 to 65 percentage of built-up land area of coastal 
municipalities were inundated by the tsunami [3]. FDMA decided to count merged fire as one fire [4]. Fire Departments 
followed this decision. From the standpoint of emergency handling, this counting system is understandable, but for pursuing 
mechanism of tsunami fires, it is better to count each fire occurrence. For example, in Ootsuchi Town at least six fires 
occurred in one large merged fire area, in Ishinomaki City at least five fires occurred in one large merged fire area as shown 
in Fig. 1 according to aerial videos, photographs and interviews to local people who were by the fire sites. 
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Besides these enlarged tsunami fires there were many small fires as shown in Fig. 2 which were not officially recorded 
because the evidences of these small fires were swept away by tsunami waves. In order to estimate the tsunami fire 
occurrences and to consider countermeasure against these fires, it is necessary to collect data of these fire occurrences. 
Table 1. The number of fires related to the 2011 Great East Earthquake and Tsunami 
Prefecture 
Result of a questionnaire survey to fire brigades in affected regions (2012)  
Fires occurred from 11 to 31 March, 2011 (Data from 11.7% brigades are missing) Official Record 
(Number of 
Fires) 
Tsunami Fires Earthquake Fires 
in coastal regions 
Earthquake Fires 
in inland regions 
Total 
Aomori 6 1 3 10 5 
Iwate 24 0 9 33 34 
Miyagi 82 25 10 117 135 
Fukushima 4 5 12 21 11 
Ibaragi 8 5 13 26 31 
Akita - - - - 1 
Gunma 0 0 2 2 2 
Saitama 0 0 11 11 16 
Chiba 0 0 11 11 12 
Tokyo 0 0 32 32 33 
Kanagawa 0 0 6 6 6 
Total 124 36 109 269 286 
  Questionnaire survey to fire brigades in affected regions: Sekizawa et al. [2] 
Official record: FDMA [3] 
(a)/  (b)   
Fig. 1. Fire occurrence points (estimated fires origins) in merged tsunami fire areain (a) Otsuchi townand (b) Ishinomaki city. The fire occurrence ratio is 
about one per 200 meters in burnt area along hillside where combustible materials from broken houses and floated houses were accumulated. 
                                     
(a) around 15:50, 11 March 2011, Yuriage, Natori, Miyagi [5]                     (b) 15:46, 11 March 2011, Rikuzentakada, Iwate [6] 
Fig. 2. Small fires circled with red dotted lines (a) at front line of tsunami waves in front of Yuriage Junior High School in Natori city and (b) beside 
Rikuzentakada city hall where were flooded by tsunami waves. (a) combustible gas ejected from gas-cylinder or tanks is shownwith a yellow doted circle. 
Some were rescued 
to climb up the 
hillside 
Many burnt bodies 
were found 
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2. Tsunami-induced fire breakout patterns 
Three main breakout patterns of tsunami-induced fires were recognized through investigations carried out by the Japan 
Association for Fire Science and Engineering [1]. All of these main patterns are related to hazardous petroleum facilities 
which potentially discharge combustible gases in case. Containers of any hazardous material were destroyed by tsunami and 
ejected combustible gases were ignited by any sparks just after the arrival of tsunami. 
2.1. Tsunami-induced fire related to leak from liquefied propane gas cylinder at home (LP Gas Cylinder Pattern) 
In the tsunami affected area, liquefied propane gas cylinders were widely used as primary heat source. Decrease of 
cylinder supplied households were about 22,000 in Iwate prefecture, about 88,000 households in Miyagi prefecture[7]. 
Since usually each household was supplied two cylinders as shown in Fig. 3(a), there seems to be about 44,000 cylinders in 
tsunami inundated area in Iwate prefecture, about 176,000 cylinders in tsunami inundated area in Miyagi prefecture 
respectively. 
When tsunami hit a house with cylinders as shown in Fig. 3(a), cylinders were disconnected and floated into tsunami 
waves. Some valves and gas-pressure regulator of cylinders were destroyed when thehouses were hit by tsunami as shown 
in Fig. 3(b). Then propane gas leaked and caused fires inside of the floating houses. Sometimes propane cylinders rolled and 
floated on the water with the flame jet which ignited the fire on buildings or materials of collapsed wooden houses when 
they come close. There were also some cases where the rolling propane cylinders drifted on the water ejecting white smoke 
of flammable gas with no flame as shown in Fig. 3(c). Kitamura estimated that causes of ignition were sparks from metals 
which collided each other by tsunami [4]. 
Some people who remained in wooden houses when the tsunami reached noticed this LP gas cylinder pattern of fires 
occurred at nearby houses. Some people noticed propane cylinders were drifting, rolling and jetting flame on the water, 
which caused fires at buildings or pieces of collapsed wooden houses. There are many witnesses of fires in tsunami broken 
houses who heard a sound of explosion from the house. 
Figure 4 shows one case of this LP gas cylinder pattern fire without a direct eyewitness. Mr. Toru Suzuki, a volunteer 
fire fighter of Otsuchi Town volunteer fire company, took this photograph of Fig. 4(b) at 15:26, 11th March 2011 in Ando 
District in Otsuchi Town in Iwate Prefecture. This was six minutes after the hit of the tsunami at 15:20 here as shown in Fig. 
4(a). The district was covered with sand smoke at 15:20, which means the impact of the tsunami was devastating. The 
location of Ando District is at the left hand of opposite shore in Fig. 4(a). 
When he passed through this point before the hit of tsunami, he did not notice a fire around here. He heard a sound of 
propane gas cylinder explosion after the hit of tsunami. Then when he again reached this viewpoint, he noticed that the 
materials of collapsed buildings were burning. There are some possibilities that the fires were caused by gasoline leaked 
from automobiles or fish boats, but it would have taken some more time for propagation of gasoline fire to building 
materials. So the cause of this fire may have been leaking propane gas from cylinders. The cylinders may have been pushed 
into a house and caused explosion inside of the house. This estimation meets the size of the fire in Fig.4(b). The situation of 
this fire at 16:00 is shown in Fig. 4(c).  
(a)   (b)   (c)  
Fig. 3. Liquefied propane gas cylinders at usual situation (a) and tsunami affected situation (b), (c).
(a) Liquefied propane gas cylinders in front of a house at usual situation [8]; (b) Disconnected liquefied propane gas cylinder and buckled at the top by 
tsunami, Iwate; (c) Combustible gas ejected from a liquefied propane gas cylinder floating on the tsunami waves at a cross street near Yuriage Junior High 
School around 15:50, 11 March 2011, Natori, Miyagi [9]. 
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(a) around 15:20, 11 March 2011, Otsuchi, Iwate [10] (b) 15:26, 11 March 2011, Ando, Otsuchi, Iwate [11] (c) 16:00, 11 March 2011, Ando [11] 
Fig. 4. Fire occurrence process, (a) situation at the time of tsunami arrival with sand smoke, (b) a small fire occurred after the tsunami arrival on the 
tsunami waves, (c) continuously occurred small fires on the flooded area by tsunami. 
2.2. Tsunami-induced fire related to leak from automobile fuel tank ( Automobile Fuel Tank Pattern ) 
In many cases of automobile fuel tank pattern fire, a number of automobiles parked in front of a building were washed up 
by the tsunami and crashed against the building, bursting into flames near the wall of the building. 
Figure 5 shows a typical case burning in front of Kadonowaki Elementary School in Ishinomaki City in Miyagi 
Prefecture. About one hundred automobiles with which local people evacuated to the ground of this elementary school were 
hit by tsunami at around 15:40 11 March 2011. Because the tsunami waves contained floating houses and materials from 
broken houses, automobiles were pushed and squeezed between these substances in tsunami waves and the reinforced 
concrete school building. Fuel tanks and vehicle fuel filler pipes were destroyed when automobiles were swept away by the 
tsunami smashed against the building. Gasoline leaked and caused fires. 
Figure 6 shows another case. After the earthquake, local people came to the ground of this elementary school by 
automobiles in anticipation of tsunami. There were about thirty to forty automobiles parked in front of the gymnasium. 
When the tsunami reached here, about ten automobiles were pushed into the gymnasium and seven automobiles were piled 
up between the gymnasium and the main building. A teacher at the school who had evacuated to a mountain behind the 
elementary school heard the sound of electric short and explosion from the gymnasium and noticed a smoke coming out of 
the gymnasium. Local people also heard the sound of explosion a few minutes after the hit of tsunami and noticed that one 
third of the roof of the gymnasium was blown off as shown in Fig. 6(a). There may have been an explosion of gasoline 
which leaked from the tanks of the automobiles pushed into the gymnasium by the tsunami. Fig. 6(b) shows inside of the 
gymnasium after the fire. 
         
(a) 17:25, 11 March 2011, Kadonowaki, Ishinomaki, Miyagi [12]. (b) 21 March 2011 [12]. 
Fig. 5. A case of automobile fuel tank pattern fire. (a) fire spread to combustible materials and a broken house floated and landed on the Kadonowaki 
Elementary School ground with tsunami waves; (b) burnt automobiles in front of the elementary school building. 
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(a) 11 March 2011, Kesen Elementary School, Rikuzentakada, Iwate [13] (b) 5 June 2011, taken by the author 
Fig. 6. A case of automobile fuel tank pattern fire. (a) a roof partially blown off by an explosion in the gymnasium of the Kesen Elementary School few 
minutes after the hit of tsunami; (b) burnt automobiles inside of the gymnasium of Kesen Elementary School. 
2.3. Tsunami-induced fire related to leak from oil tank ( Oil Tank Pattern ) 
Oil-storage tanks etc. at industrial plants in harbors, ships and fish boats which had been handling flammable liquid were 
destroyed by the tsunamiand floated on the tsunami waves as shown in Fig 7(a). The leaked oil being absorbed to timber 
and other materials from collapsed buildings etc. caused fires like wick combustion. 
The massive fire at Kesennuma Bay was a typical of this pattern. Oil flowing out of the destroyed oil tanks at 
Kesennuma Port may have adsorbed to farming rafts and collapsed pieces of wooden houses swept by the tsunami, and was 
ignited into flames [4, 15]. These blazing objects, covering some of the water surface, drifted from Kesennuma Bay 
outwards to Oshima Strait to reach the tsunami-flooded coastal area where the fire spread to ships, automobiles, factories, 
houses and forests. These blazing objects also drifted inwards to Shishiori District where already LP Gas Cylinder pattern 
fires had broken out just after the tsunami reached as shown in Fig. 7(b). The people who evacuated to tsunami refuge 
buildings near the pier of Shishiori were surrounded by the fires of these two types until the next morning. 
The proportion and rate of occurrence of these three patterns of tsunami induced fires are unknown due to the lack of 
physical evidence. There are some verbal evidences but they are not yet organized to form the whole picture.  
There were also other patterns of fire occurrences related to tsunami other than the above-mentioned three patterns. For 
example, fires from electrical short fires from batteries of automobiles flooded by sea water [16]. 
  
(a) around 16:00, 11 March 2011, Kesennuma, Miyagi [14] (b) around 18:00, 11 March 2011, Kesennuma, Miyagi [14] 
Fig. 7. Fire occurrence process, (a) floating oil tanks from which oil leaked onto the tsunami waves; (b) fire of combustible materials from broken houses 
which soaked spilt oil floating toward Shishiori District where LP Gas Cylinder pattern fires occurred. 
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Fig. 8. Fire spread of LP Gas Cylinder pattern fire to broken houses at the edge of tsunami flooded area (Origasa district in Yamada town, Iwate prefecture). 
Range of burnt area was obtained by on-site reconnaissance with reference satellite image after the tsunami fire. 
 
Fig. 9. Fire spread in Origasa district at 16:07, 11 March 2011 (photograph taken and offered by local people). 
3. Fire spread and escalation 
Degree of fire spread depends on the distribution of combustible materials. When the tsunami hit wooden housing areas, 
most of the wooden houses along the seashore were swept away and combustible materials from the broken houses and 
broken houses themselves accumulated along hillside or in some cases along banks. Some debris from the devastated houses 
was pulled out in the backwash. The piled combustible materials in such situation caught fire from drifting houses and boats 
which had been ignited. Some fires broke out at the location of the accumulated debris at hillsides or banks. 
Figure 8 shows one case of LP Gas Cylinder pattern fires. A rolling propane cylinder floating on the water with flame jet 
spread fire to broken buildings in Origasa District in Yamada Town, Iwate prefecture. The depth of the tsunami was about 6 
meters at the fire origin of this burnt area. Some buildings were partially destroyed by fire and at the middle height of first 
floors were burnt, so it seems that the height of flooded water decreased when the burning propane tank reached the site to 
cause a fire as shown in Fig. 9. 
Figure 10 shows a case where there are witnesses that a leaking propane cylinder exploded to ignite a fire after the 
tsunami hit. Fig.11 shows the fire situation eighteen minutes after the tsunami hit this district. As the height above sea level 
was about 13 meters, there was no tsunami water in this area at that time. There were wooden houses and fire spread to 
them. Four local people tried to block fire with a hydraulic shovel and extinguished fire using home hose [1] . 
Figures 1, 12 and 13 show fire sites where multiple fires occurred in combustible material beds along a hillslope in the 
tsunami flooded areas. This means that there is high probability of fire occurrence in this kind of beds and fires tend to 
spread widely at these beds. 
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Fig. 10. Fire spread of LP Gas Cylinder pattern to houses at hillslope in a tsunami flooded area (Akahama district in Otsuchi town, Iwate prefecture). 
 
Fig. 11. Fire situation at 15:38 (18 minutes after the hit of the tsunami), 11 March 2011 at Akahama district in Otsuchi town, Iwate prefecture [17]. 
    
Fig. 12. Spread of fires to houses at slopes in a tsunami flooded area (Shishiori district in Kesennuma city, Miyagi prefecture). 
Gradients of the slopes in the fire sites of Figs. 12 and 13 are not so steep compared with other fire sites shown in Figs. 1 
and 10. It could be said that the burnt area tends to be wider at a glacis slope. Fig. 14 shows that width of the combustible 
material bed is wide at this glacis slope. 
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Fig. 13. Spread of fires to houses at slope in a tsunami flooded area (Yamada district in Yamada town, Iwate prefecture). 
 
Fig. 14. Fire situation at 16:15, 11th March 2011, about one hour after the tsunami hit Yamada district in Yamada town [18].  
In the pattern in which a fire was triggered by parked automobiles being washed up and smashed against reinforced 
concrete buildings, automobiles fire spread to building when combustible materials from broken houses and floated and 
landed woodenhouses existed. When there were scarce combustible materials around automobiles, much of these kind of 
automobile fire tended not to spread to non-wooden buildings as shown in Fig.15. 
  
(a) 16 March 2011, Miyagino, Sendai, Miyagi [19] (b) 8 April 2011, Miyagino, Sendai, Miyagi [20] 
Fig. 15. Automobile Fires. (a) in front of Yume Messe Miyagi; (b) in front of a warehouse where 280 automobiles swept away by the tsunami from a 
parking lot and landed here to ignite. 
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Fig. 16. Fire site of mainly spread fires from leaked oil tank patternfires in a harbor district (Kesennuma city, Miyagi prefecture). 
 
Fig. 17. Combustible material beds surrounded with red line in a harbor district on 12th March 2011, The rightmost area caught fire on 14th March 2011 by 
unknown process (Kesennuma city, Miyagi prefecture) [21]. 
In the pattern in which fires were initiated by hazardous material leaked out of oil tanks, drifting objects in flames 
reached the coastal areas flooded by the tsunami, resulting in fires spreading to nearby buildings and other objects in the 
vicinity of the coastal and wharf areas.  
In Fig. 16, most of the burnt areas were spread by typical leaked oil fires pattern. Because wooden building around these 
burnt areas and combustible materials were almost swept away as shown in Fig. 17, the spread of fire were limited to 
remaining buildings and fire area did not became large. 
Some of the small fires and the largest fire were not related to leaked oil. In some small burnt areas fires occurred at 
factories. Hazardous materials which had been used in the factories seem to have been ignited when hit by the tsunami. 
Because the factories were not wooden structure, the buildings were not swept away by the tsunami, so the fires spread only 
inside of the factory buildings. In the biggest burnt area near Minami Kesennuma Station a fire occurred on 14th March 
2011 by unknown reason.  
This area before the fire is shown in Fig. 17. In the rightmost area there was a bed of combustible materials formed by 
the tsunami. Maybe because the depth of the water the tsunami brought was shallow around here or maybe by chance, the 
drifting fires did not reach the combustible materials bed here. As the land is flat as shown in Fig. 16, the combustible bed 
was shaped like a pyramid, on the top of that was a robust building. If the condition of the tidal wave had been different, the 
combustible materials could have caught fire from drifting fire, leading to a spread of fire to wider area. 
Figure 18 shows one example of fire spread in a flat area. Burnt area depended on distributions of combustible materials 
and areas with densely built up wooden housing. There was a variety in distributions of combustible materials from wooden 
houses collapsed in the tsunami, depending on the density of housing, and with or without open spaces and obstacles like 
railroad and highway banks. In this case burnt areas in flat area were limited. 
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Fig. 18. Fire site in flat area (Yuriage district in Natori city, Miyagi prefecture). 
Table 2. Distribution of Fire Spread Area of Urban Fires occurred around boundary line of Flooding Areas from Tsunami 
Prefecture Municipality 1020ha 510ha 15ha 0.31ha 0.010.3ha 
 
 
 
Iwate 
Noda Village     1 
Miyako City    1  
Yamada Town 1   4 1 
Otsuchi Town  1 2 3  
Oofunato City    2  
Rikuzentakada City     1 
 
 
 
Miyagi 
Kesennuma City  1 1   
Minamisanriku Town   1   
Ishinomaki City  1  1 1 
Sendai City    2 1 
Natori City   1   
Watari Town     2 
Fukushima Soma City     1 
Iwaki City   1   
Total  1 3 6 12 8 
* Only spread fires are included. There were many unidentified small fires. 
 
Table 2 shows burnt areas of major fires. The total burned area was approximately 65 ha (hectare), excluding the 
extensive area of burned forests. 
4. Status of response and secondary evacuation 
There are some hearing investigations on people who responded to and evacuated from tsunami fires [1]. There are also 
some experiences indicated in books and internet web sites. From these experiences, the tendency of response to tsunami 
fires and secondary evacuation is as following. 
4.1. Secondary evacuation from two story wooden houses 
There were some people whose tsunami evacuationwas delayed and left behind in the second story of wooden houses. 
When they survived and noticed the fire approaching, they tried to claw their way out of the house to evacuation buildings 
or hillsidenearby between tsunami waves through rough route with rubbles.Local people and some volunteer firefighters 
helped secondary evacuee to climb up the hillside near Kadonowaki Elementary School as shown in Fig. 1 (b) and Fig. 19. 
After the emergency, many burnt bodies were found where the depth of tsunami wave was below the second floor level 
in Ootsuchi Town as shown in Fig.1 (a). In this case, it could be estimated that those people had been lost their lives in the 
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fire. In Shishiori District in Kesennuma City where at least three LP Gas or automobile pattern fires occurred just after the 
arrival of tsunami, many burnt bodies were found. Near Kadonowaki Elementary School, 55 burnt bodies were found [22]. 
 
Fig. 19. Location of rescue from 2 story houses in fire risk, 15:53, 11 March 2011 (Kadonowaki, Ishinomaki, Miyagi) [23]. 
4.2. Secondary evacuation from tsunami refuge buildings 
In the case where people were evacuated to designated tsunami refuge buildings or nearby buildings, the evacuees had to 
be evacuated once again when fires occurred and the buildings became in danger. Secondary evacuation was very difficult 
in the circumstances where the area was submerged in tsunami water. People had to evacuate between tsunami waves or 
through rough route with rubble.Weak persons had to hide in a safe fire compartment in the building and their supporters 
tried to fight against the fire. 
Figure 20(a) shows designated tsunami refuge buildings in Kesennuma City. Green circles with white space inside 
indicate the locations of refuge buildings where evacuated people saved their lives. Green filled circles indicate locations of 
refuge buildings with no usage experience. Inundated area is indicated by blue dotted lines and burnt area by tsunami fires 
are indicated by red. Although people saved their lives in the tsunami refuge buildings, there were fire spread risk because 
there were some combustible materials between the buildings and the fire area. In some cases, the flame spread to the 
buildings. 
Figure 20(b) shows one example of these cases. There were about 30 aged persons and about 10 staffs in the nursing 
home. Staffs helped aged persons to escape to third floor before the tsunami arrival. After a meanwhile a fire ignited and 
spread to north side of the building. Because there were some space between the street and the building and the amount of 
combustible materials were few, the fire did not spread to the building. Then the fire came from south side. There were 
some broken houses which were floated by tsunami waves and landed in front of the east side of the building with small 
space. The fire spread to some resident rooms along the east side. The aged persons and staff escaped from some rooms on 
the third floor to one resident room on the same flooralong the west side where the influence of the fire was minimum, still 
inside of the room was hot like summertime. 
  
(a) Location of tsunami refuge buildings, Kesennuma, Miyagi (b) Nursing home, Shishiori, Kesennuma, Miyagi 
Fig. 20. Tsunami refuge buildings (a) locationin Kesennuma city, Miyagi prefecture. (b) one example of tsunami refuge buildings where tsunami fire 
spread to some part of the building. 
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(a) 20:20 11 March 2011, Kesennuma, Miyagi [24] (b) 12 March 2011, Kesennuma, Miyagi [21] 
Fig. 21. Tsunami refuge buildings. (a) in fire risk; (b) the day after the earthquake. 
  
(a) Kadonowaki, Ishinomaki, Miyagi   (b) Backside of the building [25] 
Fig. 22. Tsunami refuge building. (a) burnt tsunami refuge building by hillside. (b) a platform for bridge at the backside of the elementally school. 
Figure 21(a) shows tsunami refuge buildings in Bentencho, Kesennuma City. About seventy local people including 
twenty vulnerable aged persons evacuated to Hotel-I before the tsunami arrival. There were five staffs in the hotel. In the 
evening of 11 March 2011, a fire broke out in the vicinity of the hotel as a result of fire spread from oil tank pattern fire 
from the kesennuma bay. Around 21:00 the fire spread to a building next but one to the hotel as shown in Fig. 17 and Fig. 
21(a). The staff considered secondary evacuation but it was almost impossible to evacuate the building because of twenty 
vulnerable aged persons who could not walk themselves. So, they tried to seek rescue and prepared for fire fighting with 
indoor fire hydrant. Finally the fire did not spread to the hotel and local people in the hotel were rescued by a helicopter of 
Tokyo Fire Department in the afternoon of 13 March. Patients including infants were also rescued from Hospital-I next to 
the hotel at that time. 
In Ishinomaki City, an elementary school was functioned as a tsunami refuge building, but when the tsunami came here, 
automobile pattern fires occurred as shown in Fig. 5. About 50 local people helped each other to escape from this building 
up to the hillside as shown in Fig. 22(a). As there was a gap between the building and the hillside, they throw a bridge using 
a platform over the gap to get out of the building as shown in Fig. 22(b). This secondary evacuation was taken place in 
emergency situation with fire and smoke inside of the building. 
In Miyagino Ku, Sendai City, There were 537 evacuees at Nakano Elementary School. At about 200 meters west side of 
the school, about ten buildings, combustible materials from broken wooden buildings and about 50 automobiles got fire and 
spread in the direction of the school with strong west winds. Fire-fighting operation with helicopters was done in success. 
Hotel-I 
Hospital-I 
Kesennuma bay 
Hotel-I 
Hospital-I 
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(a) 12 March 2011, Miyagino, Sendai [26]                            (b) 11 March 2011, Nakano Elementary School, Miyagino, Sendai [26] 
Fig. 23. Tsunami refuge building in fire risk. (a) location of elementary school and the fire; (b) elementary school with a lot of combustible materials. 
5. Conclusions 
Hazardous materials were the main factor for occurrence of tsunami fires. Combustible materials from houses broken by 
tsunami determined the possibility for the fire to spread. Amount of combustible materials are related to number of coastal 
wooden housings. Drifting materials, houses and boats also contributed to fire spread. 
It is difficult to evacuate from a tsunami refuge building or a collapsed house in case of fire, it is necessary to consider 
secondary evacuation routes, safe zones in the building, fire extinguishing equipment and other strategies. It is also 
important to consider the possibility of secondary evacuation in case of tsunami fires for emergency evacuation plan against 
tsunami. 
 
Fig. 24. Mechanism of tsunami fire and responses [27]. 
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